The control of inferencing in natural language understanding  by Lockman, Abe & Klappholz, David
Camp & Moths wfh Applr Vol 9. No I, pp 59-70. 1983 UOY7~9431H3/01wSel2~03.~/0 
Printed sn Great Bntam Pereamon Pro! Ltd. 
THECONTROLOFINFERENCINGIN 
NATURALLANGUAGEUNDERSTANDING 
ABE LOCKUAN 
Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901, U.S.A. 
and 
DAVID KLAPPHOLZ 
Polytechnic Institute of New York, Brooklyn, NY 11201, U.S.A. 
Abstract-The understanding of a natural language t xt requires that a reader (human or computer program) 
be able to resolve ambiguities at the syntactic and lexical evels; it also requires that a reader be able to 
recover that part of the meaning of a text which is over and above the collection of meanings of its 
individual sentences taken in isolation. 
The satisfaction of this requirement involves complex inferencing from a large database of world- 
knowledge. While human readers eem able to perform this task easily, the designer of computer programs 
for natural language understanding faces the serious difficulty of algorithmically defining precisely the items 
of world-knowledge r quired at any point in the processing, i.e. the problem of controlling inferencing. This 
paper discusses the problems involved in such control of inferencing; an approach to their solution is 
presented. based on the notion of determining where each successive sentence “fits” into the text as a 
whole. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The topic of this paper is one aspect of the algorithmic “understanding” of natural anguage 
texts. In operational terms we will define “understanding” as the ability to answer those 
questions concerning the contents of a text which a typical human reader would be able to 
answer after having read the text. While this is clearly not a precise formal criterion-different 
human readers might “understand” a text somewhat differently from one another-it will 
suffice for the purposes of this discussion. 
In what follows we will not be concerned with the process whereby questions relating to a 
text might be answered, but rather with that part of the understanding process which 
immediately precedes question answering: the sub-process whereby a text is reduced to a 
(logic-like) formal representation from which the attempt o answer specific questions would 
proceed. The language in which such a formal representation is expressed is typically referred 
to as a semantic representation language (SRL). 
Suppose, then, that we have a text T consisting of sentences S,, S,, . . . S, in that order. The 
long-recognized existence of levels of regularity in language[l-31 suggests the following 
fairly traditional model for the computation of the formal representation of T. Each sentence Si, 
in turn, goes through the following three steps9 
(1) Si is processed by a purser to expose the hierarchy (tree-structure) of syntactic 
categories which constitutes its syntactic structure. 
(2) The “meaning” of each lexical item in Si, i.e. the item’s representation i  the SRL, is 
substituted for that item in the parse tree. 
(3) The resulting parse tree is processed in bottom-up fashion by an interpreter to produce 
the “meaning” of each phrase (non-terminal node in the parse tree) from those of its 
constituents, terminating, ultimately, with that of the entire sentence; we shall term this product 
(an SRL expression) the semantic interpretation of Si, abbreviated Sl(Si). 
The set {SI(S,), SI(SJ,. . , SI(S,)} is then taken to constitute the “meaning” of text T. 
Example 1 illustrates this process for a single simple sentence. 
The insufficiency of this traditional model for achieving understanding has been evident 
since the very earliest attempts at implementing computational natural anguage understanding. 
In the first place, a sentence taken in isolation can be ambiguous on both the grammatical nd 
lexical levels, as is illustrated by Examples 2 and 3. 
+This division of the understanding process into steps does not imply that these steps must occur in the indicated order or 
tilat there is no communication between them. 
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Example I. Parsing and interpretation in the traditional model. 
Today they are flying planes. 
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Example 2. Syntactic ambiguity (slightly modified from Chomsky 1957) 
Yesterday he shot two bucks 
!nterDretatlOn L Yesterday he &hot two male deer wth a gun 
lnterpretatlon b: Yesterday he squandered two dollars 
Example 3. Lexical ambiguity (from [13]). 
Thus the output of step 3 of the traditional model is not the semantic interpretation of Sri, but 
is rather, in the general case, a number of possible semantic interpretations of Si. 
In the second place, the set {SZ(S,), SI(S,), . . , SI(S,,)}, even if all of its elements have been 
disambiguated, rarely constitutes the full interpretation which a reader would place on the text. 
in Example 4, for example, we see (indicated in square brackets) instances of additional 
information which a reader would extract upon reading each of the two-sentence texts. 
Pronomial reference: 
I got together with Mike yesterday. He told me what he had been doing for the past four years. [He “is identical to” 
Mike] 
Pro-adverbial reference: 
I was in Chicago last week; Bill was there also. [there “is identical to” Chicago] 
Verb-phrase to verb-phrase reference: 
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John got a real workout yesterday. He swam four miles. [swam four miles “is the manner in which” got a real 
WorkoUt] 
Noun-phrase to noun-phrase reference: 
All great men have problems. War heroes have to live with their emotional wounds for the rest of their lives. [The 
set of war heroes “is a subset of” the set of great men] 
Sentence to sentence reference: 
I missed the meeting yesterday. I broke my leg just as I was about to leave home. [The (event of/fact that the) 
second sentence “is the cause of” the (event of/fact that the) first senfence] 
Example 4. Some types of contextual reference. 
In what follows we will use the term “contextual reference” to refer to the phenomenon 
(illustrated in Example 4) whereby the author of a text, for the sake of brevity, omits explicit 
mention of certain relations (e.g. “is identical to ” “is the manner in which”, etc.) intended to , 
hold between items occurring in the text;? we shall use the term full interpretation of a sentence 
Si, abbreviated FZ(Si), to denote the result of resolving all ambiguities in SI(S,) and augmenting 
the resulting S1(Si) with all instances of contextual reference which a human reader would 
recover when reading Si in the context of the preceding sentences of T. It is this full 
interpretation of all of the sentences of a text that is the goal of natural anguage understanding. 
HOW, then, might one compute FI(Si) - Sl(Si)? It has long been realized that the solution to 
the problems of disambiguation and contextual reference recovery lies in* 
0 Codifying a large amount of world-knowledge (pragmatic information)9 into a database. 
0 Using an inferencing mechanism which operates on SZ(Si), on the full interpretations of
S,, S,, * * * Si_,, and on the database of world-knowledge to perform complex chains of 
reasoning Which end in the disambiguation of SZ(Si) and in the determination of that part 
of FI(Si) which is over and above the interpretation of Si taken in isolation. 
Consider, for instance, the last example of 4: 
I missed the meeting yesterday. 
I broke my leg just as I was about to leave home. 
The recovery of the intended “cause” reference from the second sentence to the first might 
involve a chain of inferencing from the following type of world-knowledge: 
(a) A meeting is a type of activity which has a precise setting in time and in location. 
(b) Participating in an activity which has a precise setting in time and in location requires being at the indicated location 
during the indicated time period. 
(c) Being in a particular physical location during a particular time period requires moving oneself from one’s previous 
location to the indicated location by the beginning of the indicated time period. 
(d) When one intends to arrive at a particular location by a particular time one begins the process of moving oneself to 
the indicated location sufficiently in advance so that one will arrive by the indicated time. 
(e) Breaking a leg is (typically) an unexpected (accidental) occurrence. 
(f) When one experiences an unexpected occurrence one must often divert one’s efforts from one’s previous plans and 
spend time dealing with it. 
Example 5. The type of world-knowledge required for the recovery of an instance of contextual reference 
Continuing in this vein, Example 6 below gives two different preceding texts for each of 
the syntacticallyllexically ambiguous entences of Examples 2 and 3; when combined with 
world-knowledge, the full interpretation of each preceding text would allow the disambiguation 
of the second sentences, which would otherwise (in isolation) be ambiguous. Details of the 
required types of world-knowledge are omitted for the sake of brevity. 
0 Syntactic ambiguity 
(1) Before the salvage crews got to work, those aircraft which you see were just parts in junkyards. Today they are 
flying planes. 
(2) John and Betty are addicted to fast transportation. Yesterday they were driving sports cars. Today they are flying 
planes. 
tWe include in this phenomenon the phenomena of anaphora and definite noun phrase reference, as well as notions such as 
“implicature”[4]: see Lockman and Klappholz[5] for a more complete discussion of the notion of contextual reference. 
5ee 16-91 for explications of this process. 
§For a natural language understander with full human-equivalent capabilities over a wide range of texts, the contentsof this 
database would seem to have to approach all of a human’s knowledge concerning the world. 
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(I) John is always gambling but never risks very much money. Yesterday he shot two bucks. 
(2) John has been out in the woods hunting for the past three weeks. Yesterday he shot two bucks. 
Example 6. Contexts within which inferencing can resolve ambiguity. 
Now the type of inferencing required may be thought of as akin to deriving (in some logic) a 
set of conclusions from a set of axioms. The set of axioms in this case would be: 
(a) The disjunction of the set of possible interpretations of Sj which is provided by the 
interpreter. 
(b) FI(S,), FI(Sz), * * * 9 FI(Si-1). 
(c) The set of propositions constituting the world-knowledge database. 
The rules of inference would be some set allowing us to combine propositions from (a), (b) 
and (c) to produce new propositions. 
In its simplest form we may think of an inferencing algorithm as recursively “applying” (i.e. 
combining as allowed by the rules of inference) propositions from (c) to those in (a) and (b), as 
well as to those already inferred, until FI(Si) has been produced. The resolution of instances of 
ambiguity would result from contradictions derived from unintended interpretations of Si; 
instances of contextual reference would be newly inferred propositions linking items in S1(Si) 
with items in the full interpretation of the preceding part of the text. 
The above is, however, a simplification. We agree with many researchers that the inferenc- 
ing process should not be viewed as deduction in a two-valued logic, but rather as something 
closer to probability-like reasoning about the relative “plausibilities” of various propositions. 
This requires the following modifications: 
0 A “plausibility” value is attached to each axiom in the world-knowledge database. 
0 The rules of inference are augmented by a “calculus of plausibility”, so that each derived 
proposition has a plausibility which is a function of those of the propositions used in its 
derivation. 
0 The notions of “validity” and “contradiction” are replaced by suitable notions of high 
and low plausibility. 
In the next section we will discuss some of the difficulties inherent in the construction of an 
inferencing mechanism, and point out problems with certain of the proposed approaches to this 
task. In Section 3 we will discuss what we believe to be the proper approach, namely the use of 
text structure to control inferencing. In Sections 4 and 5 we will sketch the natures of 
(respectively) the data structure and algorithm that the proposed approach would require. 
2. THE CONTROL OF INFERENCING 
The major problem which immediately arises when we consider doing world-knowledge 
based inferencing is that, if we simply recursively “apply” every piece of world-knowledge to 
every part of each SI(Sj)(i s i) to which it can be applied, then we will be faced with a 
combinatorial explosion of derived conclusions. The “understanding” of Example 7(a) for 
example, requires a very different chain of reasoning from that required for Example 7(b). 
(a) John has been out in the woods hunting for the past hree weeks. His girlfriend won’t go near him until he takes a shower. 
(b) John has been out in the woods hunting for the past three weeks. Yesterday he shot two bucks. 
Example 7. Sentences requiring different reasoning from the same context. 
Moreover, there is a vast number of sentences S’ for which the two-sentence text 
Tj: John has been out in the woods hunting for the past three weeks. S’ 
is a coherent text. Each such T’ would require a different chain of reasoning for its 
understanding. But if the first sentence, “John has been out in the woods hunting for the past 
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three weeks,” caused the inferencer to pursue all of these (potentially necessary) chains then it 
would very likely be swamped before it was at all close to understanding a particular text. 
A second major problem is that of how the inferencing mechanism decides that it has 
completed the processing of SI(S,), i.e. how it concludes that all instances of ambiguity have 
been resolved and all contextual references have been recovered. That this is in fact a problem 
may not be obvious. Given the definition of FI(Si), one might propose the following termination 
condition: halt when (a) the most plausible parse has been chosen for Si; (b) the most plausible 
word sense has been chosen for every word in Si; and (c) the most plausible referent has been 
found for each referring item in (the now disambiguated) SI(Si). 
The problem with termination condition (b) is that in the general case it is not possible to 
include a complete set of word senses for every word in the lexicon. Rather, even in very 
prosaic texts, words are used in highly metaphoric senses (as in “The towns were scattered 
across the peninsula”), senses which must be determined through the use of world-knowledge 
based inferencing. There is, therefore, no fixed set of senses to choose from; as a result the 
inferencer cannot conclude that it has determined the correct sense when only one of the 
original lexical entries remains uncontradicted. 
The problem with termination condition (c) is that, in general, by examining only SI(Si), one 
cannot detect all items in S, which refer to (i.e. are intended by the author to be interpreted as 
bearing some relation to) items in the full interpretation of the preceding part of the text; in 
fact, almost any item in any sentence can be a referring item for some suitable previous text.? 
Thus the only way to formulate termination condition (c) would be: “every item in SI(Si) has 
been checked against every item in the full interpretation of the preceding sentences and for 
each such pair either an intended relation has been found or none exists.” Attempting to satisfy 
such a condition would only aggravate the combinatorial explosion. 
What is clearly needed then, is some method of controlling the inferencer, i.e. some method for 
deciding: 
0 which portions of the world-knowledge database are relevant o the processing of Si; 
0 which of the derived propositions are, at any point in the inferencing process, relevant o that 
part of the processing of SLi which still remains to be done, and which others should simply be 
discarded; 
0 when the inferencer has derived FZ(Si) and may halt. 
One proposal for the control of inferencing is that the world-knowledge database be 
pre-organized in such a way as to expose those of its parts which are inherently most likely to 
be useful in the inferencing process and should therefore be applied before other, less-relevant, 
parts of world knowledge; typical of such proposals are the notions of “natural salience” in 
Hobbs[ 1 l] and the “items to be foregrounded” in Chafe[lO]. A more refined version of this 
type of approach proposes that world-knowledge be pre-organized into clusters of commonly 
associated ideas and/or events (e.g. [12, 13/35]). The motivation for such clustering is the 
hypothesis that those clusters associated with items occurring in Sl(Si) or in the interpretations 
of the previous sentences of the text contain exactly the world knowledge that need be 
“applied” in the processing of Si. 
The problem with considering pre-organization of knowledge to be the solution to the 
control of inferencing is that this approach presumes the possibility of effectively anticipating 
(when pre-organizing the database) all associations which will be required in the full inter- 
pretation of any text. What it frequently leads to is the design of a recognizer of a relatively 
small set of texts involving a relatively small set of ideas and/or events which were anticipated 
by the builder of the database. The problem is that there is as yet no workable general notion of 
how to do such pre-organization, i.e. of how to decide how large such clusters should be and 
exactly what they should contain. Some researchers attempt to attack this problem by 
proposing a very large set of fairly small clusters which may be “triggered” (i.e. brought in as 
applicable) by other clusters, as well as by items in the semantic interpretation of the text (e.g. 
[ 14-171). This simply reintroduces the combinatorial explosion and termination problems of the 
We refer the reader to Lockman and Klappholz[S] for evidence on this point. 
64 A. LOCKMY and D. KL.APPHOLZ 
original naive inferencer, although the larger units of world-knowledge used might mitigate the 
problem somewhat. 
3. INFERENCING AND TEXT STRUCTURE 
A major problem with the approaches to inferencing sketched thus far is that they make 
little use of a very important aspect of what there is to wo& with, namely the structure of the 
text; by this we mean the manner in which the text itself introduces and expands upon the items 
(ideas) with which it deals. The simplest ext-structural feature is just the order in which the 
sentences of a text appear. To see its effect on the recovery of contextual references consider, 
e.g. Example 8 below. As its sentences are currently ordered, the phrase “to that effect” in 
sentence (f) is clearly a reference to the “fact that”/“event of” sentence (e). Yet in any 
reordering one might choose to make of sentences (a)-(e), “to that effect” in sentence (f) would 
always refer to the “fact that”/“event of” the last sentence in that reordering. 
(a) It was a dark moonless night. 
(b) We were camped on the banks of the Walapaloosa. 
(c) The fire had just gone out. 
(d) I remember that the crickets were making an incredible racket. 
(e) We were all tired from the day’s exertions. 
(f) Jack said something to that effect. 
Example 8. The effect of sentence order on full interpretation: contextual reference resolution. 
Similarly, Example 9 illustrates the effect of text order on the resolution of lexical ambiguity. 
(a) John drove across the country this summer. 
(b) His first stop was in Chicago where he visited some friends. 
(c) He then drove to Montana to go hunting. 
(d) After a week there he went to Las Vegas to gamble. 
(e) Surprisingly, he shot only two bucks. 
vs 
(a) John drove across the country this summer. 
(b) His first stop was in Chicago where he visited some friends. 
(c) After a week there he went to Las Vegas to gamble. 
(d) He then drove to Montana to go hunting. 
(e) Surprisingly, he shot only two bucks. 
Example 9. The effect of sentence order on full interpretation: lexical ambiguity. 
Clearly, then, an inferencer should attempt o detect and make use of the clues which the text 
itself provides in determining: (a) which parts of the world-knowledge database might be 
relevant o the processing of the sentence at hand; (b) which parts of the full interpretation of 
the preoious text are of importance. 
The linguistic notion of “focus” attempts to capture the latter. A focus is maintained 
dynamically as part of the processing of sentences SI through Si_1, and consists of a smal/ 
subset of the set of items occurring in their full interpretation. In the processing of Si, the 
inferencer “applies” the world-knowledge database only to items in this focus or in Sl(Si)t 
Attempts to define such a “focus” have typically made use of syntactic structure, order of 
appearance in the text, semantic case markers, and the “newness” of the items in each 
sentence’s interpretation; the problem is, however, that such techniques attempt o extract the 
focus of S, through Si-, independently of St, i.e. before Sl(Si) has been seen by the algorithm. 
Now it is certainly true that such focusing effects exist in the use of language, in the sense that 
the factors just mentioned may predispose a reader to a particular choice of referent from 
among otherwise (i.e. semantically and pragmatically) equally likely alternatives. However, 
while any such small focus may suffice for the full interpretation of many possible next 
sentences Si, there will always be many other possible Si’S whose full interpretation requires 
the use of (i.e. inferencing from) items from outside the small extracted focus.S This approach 
to text structure is, therefore, insufficient. 
tTypical of focus definitions are those found in [IO. 18-211. Attempts to use foci as part of computational algorithms for 
contextual reference recovery may be found in (22-251, among others. 
*See Lockman[24] for substantiation f this claim. 
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Recognizing that text structure should play a significant role in resolving instances of 
ambiguity and recovering contextual references till leaves open the problem of exactly how it 
might be used to effectively control inferencing to this end. What we propose as a solution requires 
that we first consider exactly what it is that makes texts understandable, i.e. that enables a 
human reader to successfully recover the missing portion of each FI(Si). 
We first recall the very basic fact that the process of writing a text consists of introducing 
ideas/events and elaborating upon ideas/events which have already been introduced. In adding 
each new sentence to a text the author must follow certain structural conventions-not as yet 
very well understood-if the reader is to be able to determine ither: (a) thaf the new sentence 
is meant to introduce something new; or (b) how the new sentence is meant to elaborate on 
some idea(s)/event(s) previously introduced. If such conventions were not observed, then the 
human reader would not be able to recover the full interpretation of the text; in fact, he/she 
would probably not even consider the text coherent. 
We propose, therefore, that the inferencer be driven by the goal of determining the most 
plausible way in which each new S’i can be interpreted as “fitting in” to FI(S,), 
FI( S,), . . . FI( S;_,), i.e. which portion(s) of the (already interpreted) preceding text Si 
elaborates on and the nature of the elaboration. The claim is that the recovery of FI(Si) - 
SI(Si) emerges from this process in the following way. The highest level task of the inferencer is 
the generation and evaluation of hypotheses concerning where and how Sl(Si) “fits in” to the 
full interpretation of the preceding part of the text. The evaluation of each such hypothesis 
devolves into the generation and evaluation of a set of sub-hypotheses concerning particular 
resolutions of ambiguity and the recovery of particular contextual references, a set which, if 
assumed to be true, would support the “fit” of Si into a particular part of the preceding text. 
The most plausible such set of sub-hypotheses which does not contradict (in the system of 
plausibility reasoning) anything in the world-knowledge database (or in the full interpretation of 
the preceding part of the text) is assumed to have been intended by the author to be inferred by 
the reader, and constitutes the missing part of FI(Si). If such an inferencer could be 
constructed, it would offer a solution to the termination problem: the mechanism would 
terminate, and would have produced FI(Si), exactly when it has found a coherent “fit” to the 
previous text for Si. 
In the next two sections we consider: 
0 The nature of the text-structural c ues which should be maintained in processing atext in 
the manner just proposed, and the type of data structure which they naturally fit into. 
0 The nature of an algorithm for hypothesizing and testing possible “fits”. 
4. A DATA STRUCTURE FOR CONTEXT 
In discussing just what sort of text-structual clues should be maintained during the 
processing of a text (for use in processing later parts) we shall concentrate on the requirements 
induced by the need to recover intended contextual references. Let us assume, then, that 
FI(S,), FI(SJ, . . . FI(Si_,) have already been determined, and that we are about to start the 
inferencing process on Sl(S;). Since an item in SZ(Si) may, in general, refer to almost any item 
in the full interpretation of the text,t a minima1 requirement for the data structure is that it 
contain FI(S,), FI($), . . . FI(Si_,). What else, though, is necessary to enable the inferencer to 
find the point(s) at which Si “fits in” to the preceding text? 
As we have noted above, the order of appearance of the sentences of a text can have an 
effect on the recovery of contextual references. Simply keeping track of sentence order, 
however, is by no means sufficient. In text A of Example 10 below, most readers would 
interpret “these particles” of sentence 5 as referring to “Zilchons” of sentence 2; in text B 
(which is identical to text A save for sentence order) the same phrase seems to refer to “The 
Blipons” of sentence 4. Yet in both of these texts Blipons are mentioned after Zilchons in linear 
text order. Clearly the implicit (via “high seriosity”) reference to Zilchons in sentence 4 of text 
A affects a reader’s picture of the structure of this text, which in turn effects the different 
resolution (from that made for text B) of the reference in sentence 5. 
“We refer the reader to [!I for argument\ in support of this claim 
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Text A 
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(1) Consider the common pseudo-atomic particles. 
(2) Zilchons exhibit high seriosity. 
(3) The Blipons, however, have a low seriosity level. 
(4) Herkimer attributed the high seriosity to extreme multifluicity. 
(5) This explains why these particles are so hard to detect. 
Text B 
(1) Consider the common pseudo-atomic particles. 
(2) Zilchons exhibit high seriosity. 
(3) Herkimer attributed the high seriosity to extreme multitluicity. 
(4) The Blipons, however, have a low seriosity level. 
(5) This explains why these particles are so hard to detect. 
Example 10. Non-linear text-structural effects on reference resolution. 
Since linear order does not completely capture those clues to preferred “fit position” which 
an author has built into a text, the data structure must also include the pattern of sentence-to- 
sentence connections (e.g. via “high seriosity” above) which the text establishes, i.e. the pattern 
in which the author has introduced new concepts and expanded on already introduced 
concepts. Some clues to this pattern are explicitely marked in texts: paragraph breaks and 
introductory words such as “Now”, “As for”, or “Anyway” indicate a “pop” from the latest 
topic discussed to either some earlier, more general, topic or to something quite new; paren- 
thetical phrases indicate a more detailed exploration of some component of a more general 
topic before returning to the more general topic. Most of this pattern, however, is extracted as 
part of the inferencing on the previous text, i.e. as part of the process whereby each of the 
previous sentences has itself been fitted into its preceding text. 
We propose representing this pattern by organizing the full interpretation of the text into a 
“context graph” whose nodes are the FI(Si) for j< i (where Si is the current sentence). The 
nodes are connected by two types of link. The first type connects each (established) referring 
item to its referent; such links, however, capture only part of what is necessary. The second 
type of link, termed an inter-sentence relation, connects each PI($) to the nodes representing 
the (those) sentence(s) to which Sj was fitted when it was itself processed; we will elaborate 
further on this type of link in Section 5. Informally, each node of the context graph may be 
thought of as representing a “topic” which its descendents in the graph have “expanded upon”. 
Example 11 below depicts such a context graph for text A of Example 10. The single arrows 
(labelled on the left) indicate the first (reference to referent) type of link, while double arrows 
indicate inter-sentence r lations. Again, no attempt is made here to suggest a suitable semantic 
representation language; the FZ(Sj) are represented here by abbreviations of the original 
sentences. 
1: Consider [the common pseudo atomic particles] 
2: [Zilchons] exhibit [high seriosity] 
are so hard to detect. 
Example I I. A context graph for text A of 4-l. 
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From the point of view of contextual reference recovery the utility of these links is clear in 
the following sense. While it is certainly not the case that a reference from some item in Si 
must have its referent in FZ(S,_,), it is the case that FZ(Si_,) should be the starting point of the 
search for any such reference, and that the ancestors of FZ(S,_,) in the context graph are logical 
continuation points for pursuing the search. The links in the context graph thus provide a notion 
of “discursive proximity” which may be used in fitting Si to the “closest point(s)” to Si-1 to 
which it may reasonably be interpreted as belonging. 
5. THE NATURE OF THE FIT ALGORITHM 
In this section we sketch an algorithm for fitting SZ(Si) into the context graph just described. 
Now the goal of “fitting” the current sentence Si into its context amounts to deciding which (of 
the) node(s) of the context graph Si can best be interpreted as an “expansion of” or “further 
elaboration on”. We shall use the notation EXPANDS(Si, Sj) to denote that S; expands on or 
elaborates on Si. Our contention is that the attempt to find the “most suitable” sentence Sj(j < i) in 
the context graph such that EXPANDS(Si, Sj) is plausible should be the overall controlling oal of 
world-knowledge based inferencing. We contend, further, that the determination of FZ(Si) - SZ(Si) 
will result from the achievement of this goa1.t 
The algorithm which we propose for finding the “most suitable” Sj makes use of the context 
graph in the following manner: we first attempt o fit SZ(Si) to the node representing FZ(Si-I), 
i.e. to show that EXPANDS(S,, Si-1) is sufficiently plausible to be accepted; if we fail, i.e. if we 
cannot generate a set of assumptions which would (in the light of our world-knowledge 
database and the full interpretation of the preceding text) make EXPANDS(S, Sj) sufficiently 
plausible, then we move up the context graph to the immediate ancestor(s) of S;_,; for each 
immediate ancestor S’, we attempt o show that EXPANDS(Si, S’) is sufficiently plausible. The 
process of moving up the context graph continues until either we find an appropriate node (or 
nodes) or we reach the top of the context graph without a successful fit. In the former case we 
add the necessary supporting assumptions to SZ(Si) to form FZ(S,); in the latter we conclude 
that Si is incoherent in its context. 
In order to complete the picture we will sketch: 
0 How EXPANDS(Si, Si) can be algorithmically defined, i.e. how to generate a set of 
assumptions which will make it sufficiently plausible (or decide that there is no such set). 
0 How the determination of FZ(Si) - SZ(Sij results from finding, in the manner sketched 
above, an Sj such that EXPANDS(Si, Sj) meets the plausibility criterion; i.e., why FZ(Si)- 
SZ(S;) is exactly the set of assumptions which enables EXPANDS(Si, Sj) to meet the plausi- 
bility criterion. 
The intuitive notion of “expansion” or “elaboration” denoted by the predicate EXPANDS 
can be viewed as the disjunction of a number of inter-sentence relations. A number of 
researchers concerned with the question of text coherence have proposed such relations. (In 
particular, we refer the reader to [28-31,22,27,24]. Typical of the type of relation proposed are: 
(1) EXAMPLES(S,, Sj) 
0 Definition: The event/state described by Si is a particular instance of or subclass of the 
events/states described by Si. 
0 Example: Ail great men seem to have special emotional problems. War heroes have to 
live with their emotional wounds for the rest of their lives. 
(2) RESULT(S,, Sj) 
0 Definition: The event/state described by Sj is (in at least a contributory way) a cause of 
the event/state described by S,. 
0 Example: John was late to work yesterday. He missed the meeting. 
tAn earlier version of this approach may be found in Klappholz and Lockman[26] and in Lockman[24]. Also, in 
Hobbs [ I I. 271 iti\ supgeqted that some of what we define as FI(S,)-SI(S,) may be resolved as a by-product of determining the 
t!pe of fit betbeen a sentence S and the (previously occurring) sentence S’ to which it fits. 
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(3) CAUSE(Si, Sj) 
0 Definition: The event/state described by Si is (in at least a contributory way) a cause of 
the event/state described in Si. 
0 Example: John invited Bill to the conference. He thought hat he might have something 
to contribute. 
(4) DETAIL(Si, Sj) 
0 Definition: SLi gives further elaboration of some aspect of the event/state described in Sj 
(e.g. manner adverbial). 
0 Example: John mowed the lawn. He did an excellent job. 
(5) SEQUENCE(Si, Sj) 
0 Definition: The event described by Si takes place in the same general spatial context as S, 
and follows it in time sequence. 
0 Example: He decided to call the Police. The sergeant took down all the details. 
Assuming that one can define a set of relations whose disjunction defines the predicate 
EXPANDS, our goal of generating the set of propositions which will support EXPANDS(Si, Sj) 
(or demonstrating that there is none) becomes one of finding a set of propositions which will 
support at least one of the sentence relations between Si and S, The “fit” algorithm thus 
amounts to utilizing the structure of the text to generate a specific goal for the inferencing 
mechanism. Once the goal has been generated the inferencer must attempt o generate a set of 
assumptions which will achieve the goal, i.e., from which one of the inter-sentence r lations can 
be demonstrated to be plausible. 
Essentially this process is analogous to a top-down inference proof-procedure (as discussed 
in [32-341 in that we start from a goal proposition and work backwards via rules of inference to 
axioms. The essential difference is that here the axiom-equivalents erminating the “proof” 
process are generally not in the world-knowledge database; rather they are any set of 
propositions whose inclusion in the database would not cause a (plausibility-logic) contrudic- 
tion. When such a set is found, it is assumed to be true (actually intended by the author of the 
text), and added to the database. This set is, then, FI(Si) - Sl(Si). 
To illustrate the point that the propositions o derived constitute the missing portion of 
FZ(Si), we sketch their derivation for the following two sentences text: 
(1) All of the common pseudo-atomic particles exhibit unusual behavior. 
(2) Blipons spontaneously change their turgidity from positive to negative. 
Assume that S, is the sentence currently being processed, and that we are examining the 
possibility of establishing EXPANDS(S,, S,). In particular, we will investigate the possibility of 
establishing the inter-sentence relation EXAMPLE(S,, S,). In order to do so we must first 
elaborate on the sketchy definition of EXAMPLE which was given earlier. We shall use the 
following schema s an approximation to such a definiti0n.t 
If sentences Si, Sj have the forms 
4: (~x)[p(x) + Q(x)1 
Sj: (~Y)[p’(Y)+ Q’(Y)1 
where S is the SRL equivalent of any of the English quantifiers “all”, “most”, “many”, etc. 
Then EXAMPLE(Si, Sj) (i.e. the event/state described by Si is a particular instance of or 
subclass of the events/states described by Sj) holds if and only if it is plausible that: 
and 
(SUMP(U) + P’(o)1 
(Sw)]Q(w)+ Q’(w)l. 
tNote that in this definition P, Q, P’, and Q’ are arbitrarily complex well-formed formulas 
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The application of this definition to the sentences under consderation is as follows: 
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0 P(x) = x is a Blipon. 
l Q(x) = x spontaneously changes its turgidity from positive to negative. 
0 P’(x) = x is a common pseudo-atomic particle. 
0 Q’(x) = x exhibits unusual behaviour. 
In order to support EXAMPLE(S,, Si), our inferencing mechanism would have to find 
support for the propositions: 
0 Blipons are common pseudo-atomic particles. 
0 Spontaneously changing turgidity from positive to negative is unusual behavior. 
Now in general, (Su)[P( v)+ P’(o)] and (Sw)[ Q( w)+ Q’(W)] may or may not be inferable 
from the basic world knowledge of a particular eader; in this particular example they cannot 
possibly be, since we have deliberately chosen fictitious terms. However in order to give this 
text a coherent interpretation, a reader must assume that the a&her intended to communicate 
that “Blipons are common pseudo-atomic particles” and that “Spontaneously changing turgidity 
from positive to negative is unusual behavior”, and must add these propositions to his FI(S,) 
unless they contradict some other aspects of his world-knowledge. In this example, as is usual 
when reading about some hitherto unfamiliar topic, a reader possesses no relevant world- 
knowledge and takes the author on faith. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The approach presented above is, clearly, just the beginning of a theory of inference control, 
A number of serious problems remain to be solved. The first is the compilation of a far more 
complete catalog of formally defined inter-sentence relations. If, in fact, the theoretical 
framework proposed here is a workable approach, one can reasonably expect that the details of 
these specifications will delimit exactly what the power of the inferencer must be, and therefore 
provide clues concerning the rules of inference which it should use and the appropriate 
organization for the world-knowledge database which it must utilize. 
In addition, the procedure for traversing the context graph must be refined, since we are 
already aware of text-structural effects which are not taken into account by the procedure 
proposed in Section 5. Consider, for example, the short text of Example 12: 
I walked into the room. 
The chandelier was the largest I had ever seen. 
Example 12. Coherent text: DETAIL. 
There is no question that this text is coherent, and the that second sentence is a DETAIL of the 
first, i.e. an elaboration of a particular aspect (“the room”) of the first. Consider, however, 
Example 13, which is created by simply inserting an intervening sentence between the 
sentences of Example 12. 
I walked into the room. 
John approached me and began to complain about his salary. 
The chandelier was the largest I had ever seen. 
Example 13. Incoherent text. 
Example 13 is clearly incoherent; in particular the third sentence does not seem to “fit”. The 
algorithmic sketch of Section 5, however, would have no problem fitting this third sentence to 
the preceding text as follows. We first attempt o fit it to the immediately preceding, second, 
sentence; it is hard to devise any plausible assumptions which would relate the two, so we 
reject this and move up the context graph to the first. And as Example 12 demonstrated, the 
third sentence is easily interpreted as a DETAIL of the first, under the not unreasonable 
assumption that “the chandelier” of the former hangs in “the room” of the latter. 
Clearly what is occurring is some sort of “blocking” effect, in that certain types of intervening 
material may prevent the interpretation of following sentences as “expanding upon” preceding 
(to the blocking material) sentences. The particular explanation for what occurs in Example 13 
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is something like: after a sentence which describes a change of state it is acceptable to further 
elaborate upon details of the new state; however after such elaboration has stopped, it may not 
be resumed without explicit reminders of the change of state or of the neu state. The 
codification of such rules (which are really text structural conventions) is a prerequisite to 
further elaboration of a fit algorithm. 
Finally, of course, there is the problem of how the inferencer will generate and test 
supporting assumptions for a particular hypothesis of fit. Both the definition of 
EXPANDS(S, S’) as a disjunction of inter-sentence relations and the different possible in- 
stantiations of each inter-sentence relation create a complex disjunction as the goal to be 
supported. This, of course, creates the immediate problem of how to decide when to “cut off” 
the inferencing process down any one of these disjunctive paths; i.e. how to decide that any 
possible set of supporting assumptions for it is unlikely to meet the minimal (for coherence) 
plausability requirement. 
We hope, however, that we have convinced the reader that the most likely source of control 
for the inferencing required in understanding natural anguage text is information embedded in 
the structure of the text itself. 
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